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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Foundations for a Sociological Business Performance Paradigm 
 
Based Upon the Fundamental Reliance on and Awareness of 
 
Cultural Imperatives.  (December 2004) 
 
Henry Samuel Marshall, B.S., University of Utah 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic 
 
 
 This thesis develops the theoretical foundation of the strategic-culture 
paradigm. This model focuses attention upon culture and appeals to the profit 
requisite associated with commercial activities, and is an integrator of business / 
domestic cultural expectations. I describe culture as an organizational attribute 
integral to behavior and strategy which represents a potentially powerful resource 
facilitating operational effectiveness, sustained competitive advantage, and 
increased business social accountability. This explanation relies upon 
conceptualizing culture at both the national and company level, and then explicating 
the dependent interplay between these realms.  Specifically, I submit that 
corporations who establish and continually adapt their culture with the aim of striving 
to maintain a fit with the domestic context are more inclined to realize opportunities, 
attract customers, and endure unanticipated business environmental pressures. 
Using information collected on Nucor Steel and Southwest Airlines, I provide a 
preliminary assessment of the virtues of the strategic-culture model as it relates to 
explaining these firms and their operations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of organizational culture has fluctuated from being a very popular topic in 
the late1970s to becoming outmoded by the mid1990s (Hallet, 2003; Hill and Carley, 
1999). During this era, the impetus for this interest was initially provided by 
management scholars in an effort to establish a link between an organization’s 
culture and its influence upon worker morale, loyalty, and most importantly 
productivity (Fine, 1984; Frost et al., 1991).  Moreover, by the mid 1970s Japanese 
automakers were competing successfully with American auto manufactures, there 
by calling into question American Industrial ascendancy. Japan’s distinctiveness as 
the first non-Western society to develop an industrial base and achieve high levels of 
economic success intrigued organizational researchers. Not surprisingly, the 
divergent cultures involved in this commercial contest seemed a sound and 
compelling issue to investigate.  Nevertheless, within the arena of sociology the 
academic ethos has generally gravitated to a more quantitatively oriented 
perspective and its associated effects which lend themselves to clearer 
operationalization (e.g. organizational structures or forms).  As a result, enthusiasm 
surrounding organizational culture has steadily waned in the midst of a debate 
surrounding appropriate variables, their measures, and the manageability of firm 
culture (Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985).  Gaining prominence within sociology’s 
organization research is theoretical discourse that addresses organizational 
structures, and more recently their relation to external environments – investigating  
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organizational phenomena as they existed and the manifestations (Calhoun, 1990; 
Perrow, 1986). Interestingly, this line of research appears to ignore findings from 
several notable studies performed over 25 years ago (Cole, 1979; Lincoln et al., 
1978; McMillan et al., 1973).  The conclusions in these studies express frustration by 
the investigators who were unable to statistically capture what they characterized as 
“major organizational differences”, which they related to the individual organization’s 
atmosphere.  Essentially, formal organizational structure paradigms were found to 
be deficient in explaining anomalous organizational behavior and performance, 
which was evidently not principally tied to an organization’s internal structures.       
The irony of the situation is that at a time when sociology’s validation of the 
importance of organizational culture research is thin (Hallet, 2003), the attention 
being paid to individual corporate cultures or management culture across firms is 
receiving considerable attention by the media, politicians, and authors who are 
attempting to address the factors associated with the bubble market of the late 
1990s, and the associated corporate malfeasance. For example: 
As an observer of corporate culture, I believe strongly that the suicide of 
Arthur Anderson – and the assault on the investing public’s trust – could have 
been avoided had people paid attention to the danger signs flashing 
everywhere in the late 1990s. This is not a book about the Enron debacle, 
since Enron, in my view, was simply the final straw for Anderson.  Instead this 
is a book about what it is like to work at a respected company as its culture 
began to decay (Toffler, 2003: 8). 
 
The Tyco 8-k report provides another example of a corporate culture gone 
awry”. “With a mix of lax controls and poor ethics resulting in a pattern of 
aggressive accounting that was intended to increase reported earnings”. 
Among other things, the report provides considerable evidence that the 
conglomerate routinely engaged in practices it had long denied: suppressing 
the results of acquisition targets ahead of obtaining them, to boost its own 
post-deal profits (Maremont, 2002: A2). 
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  Perusal of the popular rhetoric surrounding this issue suggests several 
implications: (1) firm attributes (e.g. unique capabilities) are suggested to be 
fundamental for understanding firm behavior, (2) corporate cultures have gone 
through a transformation (i.e. implying that corporate culture can change and 
possibly be directed), and (3) corporate reputations, legitimacy, and their 
commitment to social responsibility have been questioned.  Consequently, I posit 
that the recent wave of corporate malfeasance and the associated heightened desire 
to explain business behavior and strategies1 represents a unique opportunity for 
sociology and management researchers to revitalize culturally based theories.  
Hopefully, heightened academic attention focused on corporate culture will provide 
new insight and facilitate businesses to reexamine operational imperatives in order 
to effectively regain consumer trust, confidence, and loyalty - and furthermore to 
create a demand for socially responsible business practices from within the 
commercial sector.    
  I submit that the study of organizational culture should be fundamentally 
grounded within sociology.  Essential to sociology and to the study of organizational 
culture is the idea that organizations are a social phenomenon that has unique 
features which distinguish them from the environment and from the individual 
desires and predispositions of its participants (Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985). But, a 
barrier to advancing organizational culture studies could be a result of sociology’s 
reluctance to embrace and integrate diverse academic perspectives, while 
                                                 
 
   
 
1 I characterize strategies as a subgroup of an organization’s behaviors.  Strategies are an 
organization’s activities which are developed and implemented in an effort to thwart challenges, and 
increase the firm’s effectiveness at achieving a better competitive position - thus facilitating success 
which is commonly measured by financial performance.  
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demonstrating a considerable effort towards criticizing the shortcomings of other 
social science viewpoints.  Furthermore, sociology tends to treat organizations as 
manifestations of macrosocial forces, as opposed to management investigators, who 
tend to treat the organization as relatively autonomous, thus focusing on the effect of 
organizational culture on employee cohesiveness, morale and performance (Ouchi 
and Wilkins, 1985).  Not only is the level of analysis divergent in this scenario, but 
the designation of the dependent and independent variables are not in agreement.  
A synthesis of various combinations of these perspectives offers intriguing 
possibilities. For example, based upon adopting a notion that an organization’s 
culture is not independent and is susceptible to the influences from the broader 
context in which it is embedded - not only offers a better understanding of the 
organization’s culture, but the performance of the organization may be explained by 
the compatibility of this relationship.   
 Thus, in this thesis I will first apply the concept of culture to formal economic 
organizations (i.e. business organizations).  I will describe culture as an 
organizational attribute integral to their behavior and strategy, which represents a 
potentially powerful resource facilitating the achievement of superior operational 
effectiveness, sustained competitive advantage, and increased business social 
accountability. The foundation of this argument relies upon conceptualizing and 
analyzing culture at two levels of analysis:  One focuses on the domestic or national 
culture (i.e. macro level) in which a firm is located (i.e. the location of their primary 
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administrative operations, “home office”)2, and the other is corporate (or firm, 
company, organization) culture (i.e. micro level), which is a hybrid sub-culture unique 
to the firm.  The rationale for this is to accentuate the claim that in order to facilitate 
the development and effective utilization of culture as a strategic imperative an 
awareness of these two realms of culture and the realization of their interplay is 
crucial. 
Second, I will develop a theoretical formulation of a paradigm (i.e. the 
strategic- culture paradigm) which focuses attention upon culture and appeals to the 
profit requisite associated with commercial activities, and is an integrator of business 
/ domestic cultural expectations leading to commercial and social benefits.  The 
objective is to establish a foundation upon which to: (1) Describe the processes and 
outcomes intrinsic to the strategic-culture model, which facilitate social 
accountability, environmental sensitive policy, and financial performance, (2) Gauge 
whether the strategic-culture model corresponds with the priorities and processes 
expressed by two organizations that were selected for study as part of this project.  
 Third, link the elements that explain the strategic-culture model: culture, 
leadership, and strategy.  The object at this juncture will be to extend organizational 
research, which has previously linked leadership to culture (e.g. Schein, 1992) or 
culture to strategy (e.g. Burgelman, 1983).  As a result of bridging the relationship 
between these three concepts, the notion of leadership is extended beyond how and 
to what degree leaders influence the accomplishment of work, and describing it as 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this project, the discussion will be constrained to corporations and business endeavors 
within the United States.  With elaboration, the fundamentals of the strategic-culture model can be applied to 
multinational business operations, state and foreign policy, and select military operations.  
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an integral dynamic activity associated with corporate cultural synthesis and 
continual adaptation.  
As a means to identify and isolate an internal organizational resource that 
facilitates company achievement, this study focuses on two corporations that have 
demonstrated an ability to perform well in industry sectors that are considered 
relatively unattractive (i.e. Southwest Airlines – commercial passenger air 
transportation, and Nucor Steel – steel manufacturing).  Even though each of these 
companies is operating in what are commonly considered unattractive industries, 
they are consistently profitable, expand their workforce and operations, despite 
extraordinary challenges (e.g. 9/11 terrorist attack, increased security concerns, 
hypercompetitive pricing – commercial air transportation; global competition, over 
supply, environmental regulation, wage and benefit expectations – steel 
manufacturing).  
 Focusing on firms within unattractive commercial sectors provides the 
opportunity to reasonably rule out the inference that the primary determinant of a 
firm’s performance is the industry or “strategic group” in which it is located (i.e. the 
industry-structure-performance paradigm; Caves and Porter, 1977). The industry-
structure-performance paradigm fails to explain prior research providing evidence 
that there is a substantial amount of disparate performance within industries 
(Rumelt, 1991).  Furthermore, by concentrating upon unattractive industries, I avoid 
one of the chief critiques of the industry-structure-performance paradigm, which 
insists that a rigorous evaluation of an industry resulting in its being deemed 
attractive (i.e. low levels of threat and high levels of opportunity; Porter, 1980) 
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cannot ignore an assessment of the individual skills and capabilities intrinsic to a 
particular organization (Barney, 1991, 1994). That is, if a firm is consistently able to 
perform extraordinarily and is doing business within an unattractive industry, it is 
reasonable to attribute this success to the firm’s unique internal resource(s) (i.e. the 
resource based view of the firm; Barney, 1991). Thus, the questions to be 
ascertained as part of the examination of Nucor and Southwest are: (1) what do 
these corporations profess to be their unique attribute (or resource) that facilitates 
their extraordinary success? (2) What is distinctive about their cultures, and do their 
cultures represent an essential source facilitating their exceptional organizational 
performance (i.e. financial and/or social)? 
Finally, before the intricacies of culture and the strategic-culture paradigm are 
elaborated, it is important to address the debate surrounding firm structure and 
strategy. This deliberation – at times presenting fundamentally different perspectives 
(e.g. Keats and Hitt, 1988 - structure facilitates a pattern of decision making which in 
turn shapes strategy; or Chandler, 1962 - strategy causes structures) has provided 
the impetus for tremendous theoretical deliberation. The dialogue surrounding 
structure / strategy will likely perpetuate indefinitely in conjunction with the 
development of new and compelling theories.  More importantly, this discourse 
draws our attention to an important issue.  What is the basis for the structure / 
strategy processes regardless of the causal flow?  In other words, what is the 
foundation from which organizations and their managers approach the development 
of organizational forms or strategies?  What would influence managers as to how 
they formulate, prioritize and facilitate structural or strategy imperatives? I posit that 
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culture represents the underpinning upon which these activities are built.  This is not 
intended to completely preclude other environmental issues such as: competition, 
economic vitality, available technology, firm control, and other factors, which are 
potential influences.  But, considering that exceptional commercial success is tied to 
company uniqueness, researchers need to focus on the organization, and the 
customer values / beliefs that are driving the means to generate goal creation and 
achievement.  Thus, a focus on culture as a strategic issue warrants further 
examination.        
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CULTURE 
Culture is a blank space, a highly respected, empty pigeonhole.  Economists 
call it “tastes” and leave it severely alone.  Most philosophers ignore it – to 
their own loss.  Marxists treat it obliquely as ideology or superstructure.  
Psychologists avoid it, by concentrating on child subjects.  Historians bend it 
any way they like. Most believe it matters, especially travel agents (Douglas, 
1982: 183). 
 
  As part of the introduction to Culture, Chris Jenks writes, “The idea of culture 
embraces a range of topics, processes, differences and even paradoxes such that 
only a confident and wise person would begin to pontificate about it and perhaps 
only a fool would write about it” (Jenks, 1993: 1).  With this in mind, I commence my 
discussion of culture and elaborate on the two realms of culture integral to the 
strategic-culture model.  
  The concept of culture is at least complex, and at most so divergent in its 
various applications as to defy the prospect of any commonly agreeable designation.  
It nevertheless represents a significant concept as indicated by the daily and 
widespread use of cultural descriptions as a necessary rhetorical tool to explain all 
manner of behavior from commercial activities to the “war on terrorism”. The popular 
use of cultural idiom only seems to intensify the debate over the numerous 
definitions and other aspects of culture (e.g. organizational and national culture). 
  I submit this discourse is noteworthy, but not at the expense of the 
significance of organizational culture which is relegated to a tertiary subject.  
Answering the academic request for rigorous quantitative analysis of culture may be 
eventually achievable. The first step towards this is not to be deterred by its 
abstractness and to acknowledge that compromises and experimentation that 
explore cultural nuances are needed. I work from the notion of culture as a social 
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category - that is, culture regarded as the way of life of a people (Jenks, 1993)3.  In 
order to promote and add value to existing organizational literature, I have chosen to 
carve out and describe two realms of culture (i.e. national and corporate), and their 
interdependence. Although generalizability is important, one of the values of this 
project lies in exploring the key variables that explain Nucor’s and Southwest’s 
commercial achievement as it relates to culture (i.e. both realms).  From this, 
hypotheses that lend themselves to quantitative analysis can be developed that test 
those relationships on a sample of appropriate size and ultimately the 
appropriateness of the strategic-culture model.  It is doubtful that further 
development of this research (i.e. beyond this project) will result in defining and 
statistically verifying the significant amount of a particular variable associated with 
culture that provides an unambiguous result. This would imply being able to 
delineate a specific “culture recipe” for a corporation to follow. What is more 
plausible, is conceiving that multiple variables at varying levels in various 
combinations will produce a synergistic fit between the two realms of culture, which 
is facilitated by the framework the strategic-culture model suggests. 
 
Definitions: Two Characterizations of Culture  
(Social Character / Domestic or National Culture) – Character is the relatively 
permanent socially and historically conditioned organization of an individual’s drives 
and satisfactions – a foundation with which people approach the world and other 
people. “Social Character” is the resulting aspect of character which is shared 
among social groups (Riesman, 2001: 4-5). Essentially, social character is a road 
                                                 
 
   
 
3 See (Jenks, 1993) for an elaboration of the genesis and conceptual categorizations of culture.   
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map (i.e. it can be at times conscious, semiconscious or completely unconscious) 
which guides collective behavior and serves as a distinguishing factor of groups 
within society.  This includes the symbols and representations that people use to 
justify, describe or make sense of their lives and situations. Social character 
determines the frameworks or references people use to interpret their world 
(Smircich, 1983).  It shapes people’s self identity, which includes not only who 
people are, but also what they desire (Douglas, 1986).  It involves what people want 
(normative feature) and what they believe to be true and acceptable (cognitive 
feature). 
Corporate Culture – “A system of shared values (that define what is 
important) and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviors for members 
(how to feel and behave)” (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996: 160).4 
 Envision a corporation’s culture as a hybrid sub-culture of social character 
that borrows and is dependent upon social character for its livelihood as part of a 
dynamic interplay. A firm’s culture may be due in part to “an internal negotiated order 
which emerges through the interactions of its members, a negotiated order that is 
particularly influenced by people with symbolic power” (Hallet, 2002: 130) (e.g. top 
management teams). But, the overriding aura of a firm’s culture is characteristic of 
the “other-directed” schema (Riesman, 2001) where an organization’s  long-term 
achievement (i.e. livelihood – garnering investors, consumers, and attracting / 
retaining qualified employees) is tied to an ability, or process of interpreting signals 
from the social character and adapting itself.  In other words, corporate culture and 
                                                 
4 Throughout this essay the use of firm, organizational, company, and corporate culture will be used 
interchangeably.  
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domestic culture are embedded within each other.  Specifically, with regards to 
estimable success5, for business organizations the importance of social character 
lies in the conceptual frameworks it provides which in turn shape the organization’s 
perceptions, goals and self-definition of the firm and its members (i.e. employees) - 
and in firm legitimacy engendered by the public (i.e. investors, customers, etc.) 
(March and Simon, 1958). These frameworks and classifications bind the options 
and ways in which decision makers perceive the world - which in turn influences 
plans and operations (Geletkanycz, 1997; March and Olson, 1976). Also, the 
members of an organization must “buy into” the firm’s culture and exhibit a cohesive 
agreement with the organization’s values and norms.  If this employee connection is 
absent, the firm almost certainly will operate at less than optimal effectiveness or 
perhaps eventually be rendered relatively dysfunctional6. 
 A firm’s culture is in effect an “enabler” that greatly affects its vision, behavior, 
and thus the formation and implementation of strategy.  Yet, evidence suggests that 
awareness or recognition of the merit of this influence is questionable, such that top 
managers are not consistently vigilant and adaptive to the domestic context 
(Harrigan, 1985) - but exercise predominant reliance upon their background 
experiences (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).   Consequently, managerial strategic 
orientations may be dominated or attributed to individual egoism and corporate goals 
                                                 
5 In the context of this project, “success” refers to more than financial achievement – it also entails 
demonstrated concern for employees and consumers, environmental stewardship, and value creating 
community relationships.  
 
   
 
6 The rationale for this supposition is that if an organization’s values, beliefs, and standards diverge 
from social character and the associated elements of social character that employees bring with them 
to the job, the firm’s culture becomes essentially abrasive and idiosyncratic – thus, a greater 
necessity for detailed planning is required.  Consequently, there is greater probability that these plans 
will not be implemented as intended - because they will be interpreted in diverse ways and lead to 
contradictory actions. 
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generated without substantive consideration of the firm’s responsibility to its 
employees or the populace (i.e. as may be the case with Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
etc.).    
Consider a situation where top management decisions are generated as a 
reflection of their particular experiences, interests, and company culture (i.e. without 
an empathetic consideration of the domestic culture).  In this situation, how would a 
firm engender validation and legitimacy from the customer base?  Arguably, firms 
require legitimacy from the surrounding populace in order to garner investors and 
customers.  Support and legitimacy in the eyes of the surrounding population in the 
form of a positive reputation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002) and corporate social 
performance have been linked to financial success. These in turn are a function of 
adhering to domestic cultural ideologies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In other words, 
domestic culture and company culture cannot operate completely autonomously.  
They must exist in a constant interplay of relations, in which they are shaped by and 
depend on each other.  Neither company nor domestic culture provides a completely 
consistent set of ranked values, or action reference points (Beck and Moore, 1985).  
The degree of synchronization between these cultures is crucial.  Crisis and poor 
business outcomes are facilitated when firms do not stimulate and sustain a 
corporate culture that is both supportive of the goals of the company, its employees, 
and also is in line with expectations from domestic culture. This is not to infer a one 
dimensional casual flow, because a corporation’s culture may and arguably does 
have particular influence upon social character by means of advertising, product 
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development, and number of employees, thus highlighting the dependent 
relationship between firm and national culture.  
    
 Culture:  Perception and Prior Performance Related Research  
In light of the current business environment (i.e. prevalence of malfeasance, 
consumer awareness, fragile economy, renewed interest in government regulation, 
intense competition - domestic and global); it is arguable that business strategies 
need to expand beyond a primary reliance upon financial controls. And consider an 
alternative imperative as a catalyst for identifying, developing and implementing 
actions - which in turn provide for long-term competitive advantage and associated 
desirable financial outcomes. This notion is supported by a recent Pricewaterhouse 
survey of 250 corporations:  
Socially acceptable behavior, environmental sensitive policies and sound 
economic performance – known as sustainability – are likely to become 
important measures of corporate performance in the next five years, 
according to 89% of the executives surveyed by Pricewaterhouse.  Yet, 72% 
of executives who responded said they aren’t using those factors to 
determine risk to investments, to transaction or to project planning. (Bray, 
2002: A5) 
 
 These survey results articulate the recognition of domestic cultural 
imperatives (i.e. socially acceptable behavior, environmental concern). The 
information suggests that corporations have the ability to interpret some of the more 
salient domestic cultural concerns and link it to performance, but for some reason do 
not yet see the value in emphasizing it as a principal priority.  One could speculate 
that many of these surveyed corporations interpret their relationship with society as 
disproportionately autonomous, thus these data could be an indication of 
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complacency.  Taking into consideration current business tendencies (e.g. 
downsizing, outsourcing, contingent workers, mergers and acquisitions), a more 
likely postulation is that this information indicates that firms see a need, but are 
entrenched in a primary reliance upon financial controls as a strategy to implement 
and monitor operations (i.e. the process) with financial performance outcomes as the 
measure of success (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1996). 
Possibly adding to the ambiguity surrounding corporate culture and its 
importance is the existing company culture and performance research. This 
research suggests that firms with cultures that offer competitive advantage have 
found and utilized the “right” culture and that firms that do not posses this attribute 
must look elsewhere for resources which will provide sustained superior 
performance (Barney, 1986).  Other research has professed to identify the specific 
culture which, if utilized, will lead to sustained superior financial performance (Peters 
and  Waterman, 1982)7, or that “strong” cultures offer performance advantages 
under stable environments, but  these advantages rapidly become a hindrance as 
volatility increases (Sorensen, 2002). To clarify, just as contingency theory posits 
that there is no best way to organize (Galbraith, 1973) my argument is not that there 
is a definitive firm culture that will assure organizational prowess (e.g. superior 
strategy formulation and implementation). On the contrary, company culture 
formation and its effective operation as a strategic asset is a striving toward 
assimilating employees and business operations (Schein, 1992) while integrating 
                                                 
7 In the December 2001 issue of “Fast Company Magazine”, Tom Peters was interviewed and 
confessed to faking all the data that they collected for the book In Search of Excellence. Yet, 
Peters still maintains the relevance of this manuscript, and points out that it still represents one of 
the best selling business books published.  
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with the domestic culture. The strength of an organization’s culture should be 
correlated to a firm’s ability to timely and cohesive adaptation in relation to national 
culture. This leads to exceptional success for those firms that dedicate themselves 
to the idea that culture has potential as a principal resource worth gaining. 
 
Culture and the Resource Based View of the Firm 
Discourse surrounding the issue of culture and its relationship with superior 
performance seems to be centered on the resource based view of the firm (Barney, 
1986, 1991), and the notion of long-term (sustained) competitive advantage.  “Long-
term or sustained competitive advantage is when an organization is implementing a 
value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors, and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the 
benefits of this strategy” (Barney, 1991: 102).  My perspective coincides with this 
notion of competitive advantage, but extends this concept and posits that 
competitive advantage can also be achieved when several market competitors may 
be attempting to utilize the same resource (i.e. culture is the enabler of strategy and 
is a fundamental priority), but that extraordinary competitive advantage and 
associated performance as a result of an organization’s culture, will be realized by 
firms that are able to develop and utilize their culture and embrace domestic culture 
with the most discernment. Consequently, to realize exceptional benefits associated 
with culture, an organization must achieve and maintain a robust relationship 
between the firm’s culture and domestic culture. 
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 According to the resource based view, in order for culture (i.e. a resource) to 
be a source of competitive advantage and by inference a basis for extraordinary 
performance – it must satisfy three criteria (Barney, 1986).  First, a firm’s culture 
must enable an organization to generate superior financial returns (Barney, 1986).  If 
culture can be established as not only a fundamental tool in the pursuit of financial 
success, but also as a means to buffer the adherent firm from potentially negative 
market influences, then this criterion will be met.  The answer to this issue will be 
ascertained during the data analysis section. Second, firm culture must be rare 
(Barney, 1986). By implication of my definitions of culture (i.e. domestic and firm), 
the recognition that firm culture is developed through an amalgamation of the 
priorities set by a firm, and its ability to empathize with the attributes of domestic 
culture – the possibility of many firms realizing equivalent internal cultures is highly 
improbable.  Third, in order for an organization’s culture to sustain superior 
competitive advantage, it must be a resource that cannot be copied (Barney, 1986).  
Because of the socially complex characteristics of culture and the varying levels of 
firm dedication to prioritizing culture as a fundamental strategic imperative, it is 
dubious that firms trying to duplicate the culture of a successful organization will be 
triumphant.  This is assuming that firms trying to emulate a competitor’s 
achievement attribute it to their cultural resource as opposed to something more 
tangible or definitive.  Inevitably, a firm seeking to utilize culture as a source of 
competitive advantage may be better off developing their own culture based upon 
the general awareness of its potential and effective utilization of their internal human 
capital and associated firm skills.   
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 The key is to envision culture as a desirable internal resource resulting from a 
dynamic relationship with social character (i.e. social character can also act as a 
beneficial reference). The challenges to establishing firm culture as a resource and 
developing this association are considerable.  But this in itself elucidates the 
potential value of firm culture, which is a result of the difficulty to imitate it. A firm 
which effectively utilizes its culture to facilitate performance advantages essentially 
possesses an inimitable resource.  Because of its intricacy, culture represents a 
unique resource which provides the foundation for corporate decisions and actions. 
Thus, culture can be considered the basis from which to propose the strategic-
culture model. 
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THE STRATEGIC - CULTURE MODEL 
The strategic-culture model explicates several mechanisms which provide the 
adherent firm with desirable attributes. The model’s interaction mechanism focuses 
on effective cultural utilization rather than organization cultural development.  That is 
because the likelihood of entertaining culture as a strategic imperative is arguably 
enhanced if initially a depiction of what it offers and how it works is explained.  This 
is not meant to imply that the mechanism of this model is more challenging than 
developing the firm culture needed to utilize it - the mechanism is quite 
straightforward.  What will set a firm’s performance outcome apart from their 
competition is their commitment to, awareness of, and the associated development 
of the necessary skills to utilize the model’s principles. 
 In order for firms to facilitate growth or continued success within the dynamic 
market, the realization of opportunities is necessary. The ability or desire of firms to 
seek out these opportunities is based upon the values of individualism, uncertainty, 
commitment to current operations, perception of performance, and long-term 
orientation (Geletkanycz, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1993).  Intrinsic to the strategic-
culture model is the desire to seek out opportunities.  A firm’s culture that is 
purposefully embracing and accurately interpreting the external culture, in which it is 
located, is apt to identify clues as to what consumers and the public desire 
 Consider the analogy of the development of a therapeutic pharmaceutical and 
its mechanism of action.  The goal for the pharmacologist is to develop a drug 
molecule that fits as many of the desired biological receptors within the body as 
possible, which in turn causes a sought-after result with the least number of 
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unanticipated and undesirable side effects.  The more target rectors that are 
identified and engaged, the more efficacious the drug.  If the molecule is a poor fit, 
the body either rejects the drug or unforeseen poor results may occur (i.e. no 
beneficial value or damaging effects).  But, by utilizing understanding of biochemistry 
and the attributes of the problem being addressed, the goal is to not to waste time 
developing an inappropriate preparation. 
 
 
 
Realized opportunity Mechanism for Cultural Interaction 
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Positive results & 
societal support 
Domestic Culture 
Company 
culture blind 
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“Forced” 
Strategy 
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            Figure 1. Mechanism for Cultural Interaction
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  An analogous scheme is the idea behind the strategic-culture model.  Think 
of a firm’s culture as a foundation from which the organization approaches issues 
and affects the focus of their lens to which they see through - and the domestic 
culture as a collection or series of receptors. Thus, the success of a corporation and 
its strategies can be related to not only the ability to identify receptors, but also 
embrace them.  If operations and strategies are developed and implemented without 
prioritizing the nuances of the receptors (i.e. forced thru), the model would anticipate 
a short-term positive result at best and more likely detrimental results.8  This is a 
situation in which the firm’s culture was not utilized or was ineffective at identifying 
(filtering) a strategy that would produce poor results due to its incompatibility with 
social character (see figure 1).  Clues to these receptors’ mechanism of action (i.e. 
social character’s inherent desires, needs, attitudes, and associated responses) are 
provided by the employees that work within the firm (i.e. everyone carries a segment 
of these cultural receptors with them).  But, more comprehensive interpretations are 
derived when a priority is established to actively seek and expand cohesiveness with 
the domestic culture beyond what the limited (i.e. possibly biased) individual firm 
culture may provide.  Moreover, the corporation essentially lives within this body of 
receptors (i.e. the domestic culture usually bounded by designations such as: 
communities, towns or even countries). As a consequence, long-term success of the 
organization can be viewed as a function of the synergy it creates within this body.  
Conversely, the vitality of communities can be associated to the operations and 
strategies of the firms which are embedded within them. 
                                                 
 
   
 
8 An example of this occurrence would be when the Coca Cola Corporation introducing a new 
formulation of Coke in 1984, and the devastating reception it elicited from the public - resulting in the 
product’s recall and the Coca Cola Corporation losing of millions of dollars. 
 22
 This may seem like an obvious priority or rather trivial organizational practice, 
but this may not be the case.  If the recent Ford Motor Company and Firestone Tire 
controversy is considered, it could be argued that both corporations responses were 
based upon short-term financial concerns (i.e. initial refutation of a deficiency and 
deflection of responsibility / legal liability), apart from prioritizing the expectations of 
the populace and associated domestic culture.  Certainly automotive consumers 
(more notably Ford Explorer owners which number in the hundreds of thousands) 
were uninterested with the public denunciation of Firestone by Ford.  A casual 
interpretation of the domestic culture would indicate that it has a preoccupation with 
automobiles, which has evolved to include a significant concern for motor vehicle 
safety (i.e. a relatively new receptor that represents an opportunity if engaged). 
Thus, the strategy of both of these companies would have been more beneficial to 
all concerned if their activities had demonstrated a prioritization of this domestic 
cultural desire rather than ambivalence.  As a result, a one hundred-year business 
relationship between Firestone and Ford was destroyed (i.e. Firestone no longer 
supplies Ford as an original equipment supplier) and both companies suffered 
financially (Firestone more than Ford).  Moreover, if these companies would have 
worked together and demonstrated empathy for the public concern and developed a 
genuine strategy to ensure the safety of consumers, arguably each firm would have 
emerged from this circumstance in a better position facilitated by public legitimization 
and increased consumer loyalty.  Instead, it could be argued that the cultures of 
these firms facilitated an unchecked sense of disproportionate autonomy and placed 
priority on company egoism to the point they were not able to see the potential 
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opportunity within this occurrence - or perceive how a different path may have 
facilitated a benign financial impact, and eventually garnered long-term competitive 
advantage. The actions demonstrated by both of these companies are an example 
of their deficiencies and negligence of the effective interplay of company culture and 
social character.  Essentially, this is a situation where these corporate actions 
exhibited a policy and forced a strategy without regard or sensitivity to social 
character as a test or filter, which can indicate beneficial and objectionable (i.e. 
ultimately poor) strategies.  I posit that these companies would have fostered a 
course of action that was more constructive if they had adhered to the general 
principles of the strategic-culture model9.  
 Another example of a firm demonstrating blindness to, or disregard for 
domestic culture is Ortho’s recent birth control patch product launch.  The patch was 
designed and produced in only one color (i.e. Caucasian skin).  People of color were 
not provided a patch which attempted to match their skin.  As a result, there was a 
backlash from consumers and the manufacturer lost the opportunity to initially attract 
an important and lucrative customer population. This event raises questions 
concerning this organization’s culture as to how well it reflects social character, and 
the imperatives it employs in the course of its operations and strategy vision.  
Moreover, this occurrence illustrates the disregard of a significant domestic cultural 
                                                 
9 It appears that Firestone and Ford may have realized at least a semblance of the need to redirect 
their organizational approach, based upon a closer alignment with the domestic cultural.  In February 
2004, Firestone announced its second recall of Ford SUV tires before NHTSA initiated an 
investigation.  “In contrast to the public feud that broke out between Ford and Firestone after the 2000 
recall, Ford issued a statement praising Firestone for working cooperatively with NHTSA and Ford in 
the best interest of our customers” (Power and Aeppel, 2004: B2).      
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principle which rests upon a desire for recognition of racial and ethnic differences in 
combination with equal treatment. 
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LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL ADAPTATION 
Cultural adaptation has been mentioned throughout this essay as integral to 
exceptional organization achievement, particularly for firms operating in 
environments that are not conducive (e.g. attempting to operate within an 
unattractive industry). This leads us directly into the issue of one of the principal 
contentions with the study of organizational culture: can a firm’s culture be 
managed?  And I add can a firm cultivate its culture so as to realize its full potential?  
I posit yes, but that two issues need to be addressed: (1) leadership leading to 
appropriate firm goals and values, (2) eventual firm cultural autonomy by means of 
the feedback loop.  
 The discourse surrounding the examination of leadership seems to focus on 
how and to what extent leaders influence the accomplishment of work (Daft, 1983; 
Trice and Beyer, 1991).  More specifically, leadership and productivity models which 
have a general thesis which professes that “good” leadership centered on human 
relations rather than bureaucratic rules will lead to increased productivity (Perrow, 
1986). The criticisms of this perspective which is commonly designated a branch of 
human relations theory are quite extensive.10 The general tenor of these critiques 
are that leadership’s effects on morale and attitudes are relatively small and difficult 
to separate from other considerations, and furthermore there does not appear to be 
consistent empirical evidence to support the notion that worker attitudes and 
associated morale have an appreciable relationship to explaining organizations or 
                                                 
10 See (Perrow,1986). Criticisms seem to revolve around the Human Relations School’s foundations 
which profess harmony, conflict resolution, and desire for participation as integral to understanding 
organizations.  
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their performance (Perrow, 1986; Hall, 1977).   But, this point of view facilitates 
overlooking a firm’s “culture” as an integral consideration in order to illuminate an 
organization’s activities and performance - and by characterization has some 
influence on the attitudes and behaviors of members - thus describing reciprocal 
relations between an organization’s activities / performance and employee’s 
attitudes / behaviors. This is especially pertinent as our economy steadily moves 
from a manufacturing to a service based orientation. The service provider 
organization’s success (i.e. because of the sheer volume of interpersonal contact) is 
fundamentally dependant upon the attitudes and behavior of individual employees 
as they are interpreted through interactions with customers. Thus, I propose that a 
consideration of how leadership relates to not only sustaining culture, but more 
importantly the aspect of leadership integral to cultural synthesis and adjustment is 
needed.  From this perspective, “leadership is the effective activity of shaping the 
culture of an organization” (Selznick, 1957: 14).  
  
Leadership and Values / Goals Creation 
As an organization is institutionalized, it comes to symbolize particular values and 
develops doctrine fundamental to self-protection.  An organization’s image or 
reputation is a way in which these values are conveyed. For example, the 
connotations of identifying yourself as a contented employee of the IRS versus 
Southwest Airlines instantly associates you with a specific identity and outlook 
reflective of your organization’s values and goals.  Leadership involves the 
expression and development of such goals and identity (Selznick, 1957).  Moreover, 
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the goals and values which the corporation’s culture favors are not static. The 
process of striving and the practice of paying close attention to the signals from 
social character are never-ending.  This implies that a paramount leadership 
responsibility involves identifying the need for, and initiating adjustments to a firm’s 
culture. A firm’s leadership (i.e. predominately top management teams which are 
positioned within the organization with a principal responsibility and associated 
authority to orient operational activities) must skillfully make the transition from a 
cultural identification function into a development and implementation role. A notion 
of leadership as the power to suspend a firm’s current cultural preferences through 
such things as procedural or asset deployment changes will not suffice.  Leadership 
must entail influencing (i.e. changing) the firm’s current cultural imperatives and 
associated predilections. Essentially, in order to realize culture as a resource, the 
effective management of a firm’s culture is part of an ongoing activity which in itself 
is a strategy - that in turn aids in the development and implementation of other 
strategies. 
 Additionally, the formation of a “new” organization’s culture (i.e. the initial 
culture a firm has and is founded upon) and its effect as a foundation from which 
future cultural adaptations and organizational strategies are gauged is an important 
consideration. Therefore, highlighting the potential impact and relational dynamics 
between leadership and culture as the firm evolves or experiences environmental 
challenges.  One must bear in mind that corporate culture involves a set of values 
and that these values play a central role in the establishment of goals.  A new firm’s 
self-identity and culture are initially vulnerable since the culture of the new firm is 
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arguably a refection of the leadership’s values and perspectives (Goffee and Jones, 
1998) more than at any other epoch in the life of the organization. If the firm is 
initially successful, the organization will likely develop a culture that is based upon 
these founding principles. But, long-term success is logically tied to the ability of the 
firm to continually adapt itself as it experiences market and/or domestic cultural 
shifts.  In this situation, the firm may need to adjust its culture in order to bring it back 
in line with the environment. This is a situation where firm leadership is required to 
acknowledge that the firm’s culture may be manifesting limitations, and develop 
activities which profess and facilitate cultural adaptation.  This does not necessarily 
imply that all the founding cultural principles of a firm should be discharged.11 The 
degree to which the new firm’s culture reflects / embraces a relationship with 
domestic culture, and facilitates an ability to appropriately reference founding 
imperatives in the course of seeking to stay in line with social character indicates a 
need to create a delicate balance. This is not only a complex, but necessary task.  It 
leads to the question: what are the leadership elements required of managers that 
facilitate these activities and associated desirable outcomes?    
 Research indicates that there are several traits / skills that assist leaders in 
creating, instilling, and maintaining culture (House, 1977; Trice and Beyer).  
• Personal qualities such as: self confidence, dominance, and strong conviction 
in the moral righteousness of their beliefs. 
 
• Vision and Mission: The ability to acutely discover opportunities and propose 
unique processes which engender successful exploitation. 
                                                 
11See (Toffler, 2003). The inference is that the demise of Arthur Anderson can be traced to a shift 
from a founding culture which was based upon personal honor, duty, courage, integrity (i.e. 
sometimes referred to as the Samurai culture) and the eventual transition to a culture that focused 
upon generating profits as the primary imperative (i.e. a Merchant culture).  
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• Followership: The ability to empathize with subordinates and actively put 
aside ones own biases and assumptions. 
 
• Demonstrated Behavior: Creating impressions of competence, 
communication of goals, optimism, and exhibiting confidence in subordinates. 
 
• Performance: achievements of particular success and accomplishments. 
  
• Use of Tradition: Utilization of stories, symbols, and reward systems 
communicate and affirm company culture. 
 
It is important to consider that this list contains several components that are 
characteristic of pathology (e.g. haughtiness, dominance, righteousness of belief, 
manipulating impressions, and a dependence upon recognition of particular success 
and achievement) (Beers and Berkow, 1999). Taken in combination with the 
economic realization that markets tent to focus on short-term financial returns and 
profit is compulsory, a divergent amalgamation of forces is revealed that has the 
potential to reinforce objectionable leadership and associated organizational 
qualities. The firm must highlight an organizational, and thus leadership challenge of 
staying disciplined and focused upon being commercially astute and insistent, but 
not crossing into the realm of imprudent or disordered behavior. The firm thereby 
avoids what could lead to a less than advantageous company culture. 
Hence, I submit additional leadership traits:  
• Respect for and recognition of the potential for increasing capabilities as a 
result of seeking diverse, sometimes contradictory viewpoints. 
 
• A resolute ethical and honorable orientation.  
 
And I posit that all these attributes represents an interdependent list.  That is, in 
regards to the process of developing and managing an organizations culture which 
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is regarded as value adding - all eight of these leadership characteristics are posited 
as necessary in order to garner a tempering and beneficial effect. 
                        
Cultural Autonomy 
Firm cultural autonomy represents another essential issue integral to managing 
organizational culture effectively (i.e. optimizing a firm’s culture as an enabler of 
operations and strategies, thus realizing culture’s potential to generate competitive 
advantage).  Autonomy is the ability to make decisions and implement programs 
independent of external influence without worry of adverse reaction from observers 
(Smith, 1976).  An organization’s cultural autonomy depends on its position on the 
continuum that ranges from a direct reflection of external culture (i.e. social 
character) to the innovation and dissemination of a completely distinct company 
culture.  A firm with a strong degree of attachment and identity with the external 
culture would possess relatively high autonomy.  That is, because of the established 
relationship, the firm’s activities and strategies are less apt to be scrutinized.  The 
strategic-culture model impresses the importance of the firm’s ability to embrace this 
relationship, which in turn garners public legitimacy and aids in generating and 
maintaining its own beneficial culture. This culture in turn constitutes the firm’s 
identity and goals, and articulates the firm’s taxonomy schemes in which it prioritizes 
and interprets the external environment.  Different firms will have dissimilar success 
with this process; greater ability in this regard enhances autonomy and increasing 
the probability of establishing competitive advantage. The more autonomous the 
firm, the more it possesses an independent and legitimate right to interpret a 
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situation, analyze it using its internal capabilities, and then to dictate a suitable 
response (Abbott, 1988).   
 A “cautious” amount of autonomy is a valuable and desired firm attribute, but 
it also presents a future challenge for companies that are able to achieve it.  In 
consideration of a firm’s autonomous position, complacency may set in.  This in turn 
could eventually put the company in a situation where it does not adapt to the 
external environment to the point of putting into practice strategies which are not 
suitably receptive to social character - thus losing legitimacy, damaging its 
reputation, and diminishing its market success.  In essence, initial dedication to, and 
utilization of the strategic-cultural scheme may be responsible for achieving a 
privileged business and social position – but if reliance on its imperatives wavers, 
the consequence may be substantial firm downfall. 
 
Linking Culture, Strategy and Leadership 
 As noted, prior research has discussed a relationship between leadership and 
culture (e.g. Schein, 1992) or culture and strategy (e.g. Burgelman, 1983). But these 
binary relationships do not fully explain the strategic-culture model.  In order for the 
strategic-culture paradigm to realistically operate it is necessary to view effective 
utilization of culture as reliant upon strategies and at the same time a catalyst from 
which strategies are produced , all of which requires effective management of 
culture (i.e. leadership) – that implies management of strategies. This requires 
reconsidering the above posited distinctions of culture and the interplay between 
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cultural realms (i.e. company and domestic culture). From doing this the following 
interpretations are submitted: 
• Culture is a semi-rational concept stemming from the values, traditions and 
norms of behavior brought into and held by the firm’s managers / employees. 
 
• Culture emerges out of the cumulative effect of many formal and informal 
actions and decisions in use daily and over years by employees. 
 
• Culture is embedded and a form of pattern maintenance for employee and 
management behavior that provides direction for the firm. 
 
 The implication from these statements is that strategy could be substituted for 
culture in each of these phrases.  “Strategy represents the more or less explicit 
articulation of the firm’s theory about its past concrete achievements.  This theory 
defines the identity of the firm at any moment in time.  It provides a basis for 
maintenance of its identity and for the continuity in strategic activity” (Burgelman, 
1983: 66).  Hence, this explanation of strategy forms the connection between 
leadership (which involves articulation activities, Selznick, 1957), culture and 
strategy, and thus the manner of the strategic culture model is recognized. 
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NUCOR STEEL AND SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: A VIEW OF ACHIEVEMENT 
WITHIN UNFAVORABLE INDUSTRIES 
 
Data 
The analysis of these two organizations is based on public documents and historical 
data supplied by Southwest Airlines and Nucor Steel, and assessment of the United 
States Bureau of Statistics Economic Census (i.e. 1997 and 2002).   
Nucor was contacted and subsequently provided the following information: 
Annual reports 1997 thru 2002, executive management review 2003, Financial 
statistical data 1991 thru 2002, historical financial data comparing each year 1966 
through 2002, and a power point presentation elaborating the history of the 
company, operational priorities and goals, EPA assessment of Nucor, OSHA’s report 
on Nucor, corporate mission statement, benefits policies, and management structure 
/ philosophy. 
Southwest Airlines was contacted and subsequently provided the following 
items:  mission statement to the employees and customers, social responsibility 
statement, corporate governance guidelines, historical fact sheet, code of ethics, 
annual reports 1997 through 2002, equipment profiles as they relate to 
environmental concerns, and a statement of requirements elucidating the board of 
director’s qualifications and code of ethics. 
It is pertinent to establish that both Southwest and Nucor are recognized as 
exemplary firms not only within their respective industries, but also in relation to the 
overall field of commercial enterprise.  For example, as of the conclusion of 2002 
Southwest has reported thirty consecutive years of profitability and profit sharing 
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while maintaining 100 percent job security. This accomplishment is surprising when 
closer examination of their annual reports reveals that in 2002 Southwest was the 
only major airline that made a profit. The other major airlines reported an aggregate 
net loss in excess of $10 billion, and two of them filed petitions for bankruptcy. And 
at the end of 2002, Southwest Airlines market capitalization exceeded that of all 
other major airlines, combined.  Furthermore, in comparison of the 30 best 
performing stocks since its debut in 1972, Southwest is ranked No. 1.  More 
specifically, since August 1972 Southwest has produced annualized returns of 
25.99% (Southwest Airlines Annual Report, 2002). 
Nucor as well has notable achievements that include being profitable every 
year and quarter since 1966, and despite the fact that the steel manufacturing 
sector’s overall revenues decreased by 19.2% from 1997 to 2002 Nucor’s sales 
increased 2.2%. Moreover, as the steel industry lost 116,102 jobs from 1997 to 
2002, Nucor added 2900 jobs.  Accordingly, Nucor has established itself as the 
largest U.S. structural steel bar, steel joist, and steel deck producer.  In the midst of 
these accomplishments, Nucor has been the nations only steel facility acknowledged 
by the EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track Program, and as of 2002 is 
recognized as the largest U.S. recycler, effectively converting over 13 million tons of 
scrap metal into useful products (Nucor annual report, 2002).               
What do these corporations profess to be their unique attribute (or resource) 
that facilitates their achievements?  Based upon an initial review of the information 
gathered on Nucor and Southwest and scrutiny of the rhetoric each company uses; I 
determined that the annual reports represented the most direct depiction of their 
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self-described strategies - and what each firm declared as the reason they feel their 
operations have been and will continue to be uniquely successful. 
  
Assessment of Southwest Airlines 
The most obvious item to investigate was if the firms actually stated, “Our success is 
due to”.  The results of this exercise indicated an interesting result.  In every annual 
report, whether it was in a letter to investors from Southwest’s Herb Kelleher 
(company chairman) or a member of the top management team, they identified 
Southwest’s culture or spirit and the people that encompass these entities as a 
primary reason for their success.  For example:  
 Southwest has a unique and powerful Culture that is the envy of corporate 
America (Southwest Annual Report, 1997). 
 
Culture is why we continue to produce winning seasons (Southwest Annual 
Report, 2000). 
   
A noteworthy result from specifically examining the introduction section of 
Southwest’s annual reports, which includes a letter to the investors by the chairman 
of the board and additional situation statements, revealed that there were 50 
references to the admirable qualities and the integral feature Southwest employees 
play in the competence of the airline. Such as:  
Although we cannot predict what external, uncontrollable events might 
transpire during 2003, we can forecast with considerable certainty that our 
valorous, caring, nimble, good-hearted People will ensure that Southwest 
ends 2003 just the way it ended 2002 - at the forefront of our industry 
(Southwest Annual Report, 2002). 
 
 As a result of the extraordinary efforts of our Employees, we quickly restored 
operations with exceptional on time performance and reliability (Southwest 
Annual Report, 2001).  
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The unity, altruism, and result-oriented focus of our People are both my joy 
and pride as we enter our 30th year of commercial air service (Southwest 
Annual Report, 2000).  
 
 Note that every time the word Employee, People (i.e. referring to a member of 
Southwest’s staff), Culture, or Spirit is used in Southwest’s text, it is capitalized.                  
 In Southwest’s 2002 annual report, the company indicates that 2002 was the 
worst financial year in the past 30 years for the entire airline industry. Yet, they are in 
a position to grow and prosper. They identify seven principle items that have 
facilitated this position:  
1. Low Costs - Southwest has the lowest operating cost of all the major airlines. 
The reason for this: single aircraft type; efficient, high-utilization, point to point 
route structure; hardworking, innovative, and highly productive Employees. 
 
2. Low Fares – Every seat, every flight, and every day. Southwest is known as 
“the” low fare carrier. And that brand serves Southwest well in today’s difficult 
operating environment when, as Southwest submits, “we are all low fare 
carriers”. The Southwest philosophy is low fares.  
 
3. Frequent flights – In markets served, Southwest strives to be the largest 
carrier in terms of customers carried and flights flown.  This gives customers 
convenience and lots of options to reach their destination. 
 
4. Strong Financials – Southwest is the only U.S. airline that maintains an 
investment grade credit rating (“A” Standard & Poor’s and Fitch).  As of 2002, 
Southwest had $1.8 billion in cash on hand (six months of operating 
expenses), and unmortgaged assets of $5 billion. 
 
5. Legendary Customer Service – Due to Southwest’s committed and 
insuperable Employees, despite the stress and strain of instituting drastic 
changes in airport security and a disastrous economic environment, 
Southwest’s focus upon customer service and providing affordable air 
transportation never wavered.  For the 12th straight year, Southwest had the 
best customer compliant record of any U.S. airline. Southwest ranked first 
among airlines for customer service satisfaction, according to a survey by the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index, as reported by The Wall Street 
Journal. 
 
6. Rapid Rewards – Customers receive a roundtrip ticket to anywhere within the 
Southwest system after just eight round trips or 16 one way flights.  This 
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program was honored as frequent flier Program of the Year, Best Award 
Redemption, and Best Bonus Promotion among all frequent flier programs in 
Inside Flyer magazine’s annual Freddie Awards. 
 
7. Cautious Growth – Steady manageable growth has enabled Southwest to 
keep its debt under control and profits intact while allowing the doubling of the 
aircraft fleet in less than nine years.  Considering the difficult environment, no 
new cities were added in 2002 and none planned for 2003.  However, four 
new city-pairs were added.  Given the financial condition of Southwest’s 
competitors and the resulting downsizing, Southwest is uniquely positioned to 
grow.  
 
It is important to highlight that if the cultural attributes of motivation, loyalty, 
commitment, productivity, and innovation are removed from this list - what is left are 
procedural operations that are decidedly visible and imitable. It is feasible that a 
competitor could relatively easily identify and copy them - thus, rendering them no 
longer a source of long-term competitive advantage.   
 Further examination of Southwest’s information revealed another intriguing 
notion.  Southwest considers its “air service as freeing Americans to move about 
their country; enshrines Southwest as a symbol of Freedom for the United States; 
and honors their People as the industry’s foremost Freedom Fighters” (Southwest 
Annual Report, 1997).  This perspective is extensively elaborated through six 
“stories of freedom” requiring fifteen pages in the 1998 annual report. Southwest 
professes that air travel was segregated before it began operations (June 18, 1971) 
due to the prohibitive cost of flying.  To bolster this proposition, Southwest indicates 
that it annually receives on average 100 requests from communities to add them as 
part of their flight schedule.  And for those locations that are selected, the number of 
air travelers increases significantly - often three fold causing what the U.S. 
Department of Transportation refers to as the “Southwest Effect” (Southwest Annual 
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Report, 1998). Effectively, Southwest identified and acted upon a domestic cultural 
shift which involved a heightened demand for equality and independence - that was 
facilitated by the racially charged social movements of the 1960s and 70s. In the 
process Southwest identified a market opportunity (i.e. primarily domestic short 
haul).  
We are proud to be a part of a vision that resulted in one of America’s most 
basic freedoms – affordable flight (Southwest Annual Report, 1999). 
   
 The inference is that the theme behind all off the allegations Southwest 
professes to be producing their achievement is an altruistic spirit, facilitated by a set 
of values and goals, which are fundamentally grounded by referencing social charter 
and the ability to utilize an associated unique firm culture.  
Southwest’s Culture is often the yardstick for many American corporations. 
Our Culture is unique because of the SOUTHWEST SPIRIT of our 
Employees. Defining SOUTHWEST SPIRIT is difficult, but one of the 
important components is an altruistic nature that places others before self. 
Our Employees are famous for their warm hearts and giving nature, which is 
what makes Southwest a company with a conscience. The Employees of 
Southwest are committed to “doing the right thing,” which is why giving back 
to the communities we serve and contributing positively to our environment is 
simply the way we do business (Southwest Airlines Social Responsibility 
Statement, 2002). 
 
 The idea that the Southwest’s culture is the envy of corporate America is not 
a surprising submission. Southwest culture is notorious because they advertise and 
rely upon it.  The rudiments behind their use of culture are reasonably evident. 
Consider the impetus upon which Southwest built the airline has an altruistic 
component - increase access to the speed and safety of air travel by bringing 
affordable and convenient air travel to the populace.  To achieve this aspiration the 
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founders of Southwest overcame a plethora of obstacles12 generated by established 
airlines in their effort to thwart competition. This contest seems to have solidified 
Southwest’s resolve and arguably attracted support in the sense that Southwest was 
considered the underdog that took on goliath, and prevailed.   
 Competition (i.e. honorable competition) is a salient domestic cultural 
imperative. The basis of this domestic cultural receptor can be traced to the break 
with tradition which attended migration to the United States, and the two century 
collective challenge of subduing a rich and untamed continent. Embracing 
competition is so significant to Southwest that they feel the need to actually 
delineate their competitive viewpoint.  
We seek to outperform our competitors fairly and honestly.  We seek 
competitive advantage through low costs, low fairs, and superior Customer 
Service, never through unethical or illegal business practices.  Our advertising 
and other communications with customers are simple, direct, and 
straightforward, as well as compliant with the law.  We make our decisions 
concerning pricing, markets, routes and customers to be served and do not 
enter into illegal agreements with our competitors (Southwest Airlines’ Code 
of Ethics, 2003). 
 
 The main plaintiffs against Southwest (Texas International, Braniff and 
Continental airlines) were figuratively blind to the domestic cultural relationship 
Southwest was establishing and the associated opportunities. To the extent that 
Texas International and Braniff no longer exist and Continental’s performance has 
been inconsistent (Maynard, 2004). 
 Based upon the limited data selected for this study, the evidence suggests 
Southwest has achieved a notable degree of conformity with social character. The 
number of domestic cultural receptors that Southwest strives to and actively 
                                                 
12 See (Freiberg K. and Freiberg J. , 1996) for an extensive description of the legal and advertising campaign 
that was brought to bear by several airlines in the effort to stop Southwest from operating.    
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embraces is fascinating when they are considered: environment, job security, 
community involvement, equality, competition, service excellence, candidness, and 
personnel relationships.  Perpetuating this relationship and cultivating an internal 
culture that facilitates this connection is a purposeful tactic within Southwest.  
Southwest diligently seeks employees by focusing primarily upon synergy between 
the potential employee’s values and attitudes, and the cultural attributes of 
Southwest (Southwest Annual Report, 1999, 2000). By doing this, Southwest 
demonstrates recognition that employees are representative of domestic culture.  
Prioritizing employees through the action of graciously crediting them for the reason 
behind Southwest’s success indicates validation of the needs, drives and 
satisfactions of both firm and domestic culture.  
 Moreover, Southwest’s history entails very consistent leadership.  Herb 
Kelleher was part of the initial group of entrepreneurs that founded Southwest 
Airlines and was closely involved in day to day operations until the conclusion of 
2003.  During his tenure at the helm of Southwest a core doctrine was established 
and maintained.  The idiom within the data indicates that this doctrine includes a 
principle set values that include: profitability, low cost, family, fun, love, hard work, 
individuality, ownership, legendary service, egalitarianism, common sense/good 
judgment, simplicity, and altruism.  It appears that the combination of Kellehers’s 
leadership, which arguably can be characterized as charismatic (Weber, 1978), and 
the integration of these core values has manifested a significant firm culture.  
Significant not only since it appears to be inimitable, but also because Southwest 
represents an organization which has developed an atmosphere conducive to a 
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unique level of social solidarity (Durkheim, 1933). This solidarity produces a strong 
sense of attachment between employees and provides a connection to domestic 
culture by prioritizing its desires. As a result, a sense of purpose is cultivated that 
manifests itself in the organizations ability to consistently meet environmental 
challenges such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 - while maintaining  firm objectives 
(e.g. low operating costs, customer service, etc.), and in the process produce 
desirable outcomes.  An interesting query for further research would be to explore 
the variables that are inherent in Southwest’s culture such as: charismatic 
leadership, leadership tenure, egalitarianism, job security, recognition of mistakes, 
environmental stewardship, and altruism as they relate to levels of social solidarity 
and firm performance for other organizations.   
 This illuminates an interesting issue. The evidence gathered for this project 
does not provide a clear delineation of Southwest’s method to success as it relates 
to the cultural realm relationship.  If an other-directed (Riesman, 2001) depiction of 
the organization’s cultural dynamic is most appropriate, then the ability to be 
sensitive to social character as a primary source of direction, in combination with the 
associated sensory prowess that provides a communication with society that is 
beyond the externals of appearance and propriety - is critical to explaining this 
organization and its long-term commercial success.  This is different than an inner-
directed (Riesman, 2001) depiction of organizational culture.  That is, if the company 
has a primarily inner-directed organizational culture, then the key to explaining the 
firm and its long-term success is a case where the organization’s culture had in its 
infancy adopted a definitive set of guiding principles that are relatively static. These 
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in turn act as standards which are continuously referenced in the course of 
commercial operations. In essence, these guiding principles produce such a 
powerful framework from which to guide the organization’s operations, a relative 
independence or insensitivity of domestic cultural shifts is realized.  In the case of 
Southwest, it appears that they have the capacity to exercise both inner and other-
directed attributes in a collaborative manner. This phenomenon highlights a crucial 
area for further examination, what perspective takes precedence and what is the 
threshold at which reliance upon founding standards needs to be adjusted in the 
course of changing social character as it relates to firm “success”? 
  
 Assessment of Nucor Steel 
As with Southwest, the examination of Nucor’s information began with a detailed 
reading to ascertain if the company actually states what its success is attributable to, 
and how consistent is their submission.  Markedly, the tone of Nucor’s Annual 
reports’ introductory statements and letters to investors are much more statistically 
based - especially during the 1997 through 2000 period before the selection of 
Daniel DiMicco as President and Chief Executive Officer.  Comparing the literature 
elicits characterizing Southwest’s language as very demonstrative, whereas Nucor’s 
idiom is reserved and succinct.  The 1997 thru 1999 introductory messages appear 
to be a form letter with changes to financial results and minor sentence structure the 
only differences. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the cover of all Nucor annual 
reports lists all the names of the firm’s employees.  Consequently, the company data 
before 2000 does not elaborate extensively concerning self-described reasons for its 
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success. The suggestion is that Nucor’s initial achievement was tied to focusing on 
market niches that it considered under served – fabricating steel joist for use in 
nonresidential construction and making steel itself from recycled scrap metal.  In the 
process of establishing the firm’s prominence, Nucor located in rural areas across 
America where the company established strong ties with local communities, which 
resulted in many locales competing by providing amiable government policies and 
fervent “nonunion” workers. Nucor utilized very conservative financial practices, and 
aggressively sought to adapt innovative technology that would produce products 
more efficiently and facilitate lower operating costs.  Additionally, the corporation 
was organized with only 4 management layers and a notably lean corporate staff 
(e.g. 30 people serving 9800 employees as of 2002) (Nucor Annual Report, 1997, 
1998, 2002). This information indicates a very efficient corporation that is focused on 
productivity, technology, low operating costs, and community relationships - but not 
necessarily and strategies that are reliant upon a unique resource.           
 As part of the 2000 annual report, an executive recap of the more than three 
decades (1965 – 1997) in which Kenneth Iverson lead the corporation, and the 
associated success is elaborated as follows: 
Ken Iverson took over a failing nuclear instruments company in1965 and 
turned it into one of the most admired companies in America. Mr. Iverson 
cultivated a unique culture – where workers were rewarded for their 
production, executives received the same benefits as everyone else and plant 
managers operated their plants as independent businesses.  Under these 
principles, Nucor grew into one of the largest and most profitable steelmakers 
in the United States and a company that could compete with any steelmaker 
worldwide. Mr. Iverson was quick to take intelligent risks.  Yet, he never got 
carried away with his accomplishments. He was quick to point out his 
mistakes, to share credit with all Nucor employees and to respond to personal 
requests from any worker or customer (Nucor Annual Report, 2000). 
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Within the Nucor information assembled, the above passage is the first reference to 
culture, and also indicates several of the guiding principles of the firm: incentive pay, 
egalitarian benefits, plant autonomy, and risk predilection.  This passage also 
provides a clue as to some of the leadership traits Iverson demonstrated: modesty, 
respect for employees, tolerance for mistakes, and altruism. 
  Starting in the 2000 annual report, which coincides with the transition of 
Daniel R. DiMicco to the President and Chief Executive Officer position, Nucor 
started advertising a new company theme, “Our Goal is to Take Care of our 
Customers…..its is our nature”.  Furthermore, DiMiccio elaborates that, “in order to 
accomplish this Nucor must be the safest, highest quality, lowest cost, most 
productive, and most profitable steel company in the world, while being cultural and 
environmental stewards in the communities where they live and work” (Nucor Annual 
Report, 2000). This information stresses the firm’s customer focus, several internal 
principles as a framework to work within, and interestingly he adds the components 
of being cultural and environmental stewards. This indicates some sensitivity to 
social character.   
 The examination of the power point presentation and 2002 annual report 
provided particular evidence as to the priority and necessity that Nucor places on its 
culture.  Both pieces of data describe Nucor’s desire for continued growth.  One of 
the approaches to achieve this growth is an acquisition strategy that is characterized 
as “a departure from normal policy” (Nucor Annual Report, 2002).  The reluctance to 
embrace this strategy in the past is evidently tied to a concern for maintaining 
Nucor’s culture. For example: 
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We promise to move carefully down this path, starting slowly as we learn the 
art and science of integrating acquired assets into Nucor’s culture (Nucor 
Annual Report, 2002). 
  
The checked track record of other mergers in all industries boils down to tree 
principles: Don’t over-pay, Stick to business you know, Make sure the 
companies have compatible cultures (Nucor Annual Report, 2002). 
 
It is easy for culture to become diluted through acquisitions and growth, so we 
must be stewards of our culture (Nucor Annual Report, 2002). 
 
The reason DiMicco submits for such a concern for Nucor’s culture is “our success 
in large part is driven by our culture” (Nucor Annual Report, 2002).  Interestingly, the 
2002 letter to stockholders contains seven references to the importance of Nucor’s 
culture. This document also explicitly states the self-described elements of Nucor’s 
culture are: commitment to employees, teamwork, safety, customer focus, high 
quality standards, ethics and integrity, continued improvement, risk taking, pay for 
performance, environmental focus, decentralized divisions, entrepreneurial sprit, and 
profitability. Noticeably, this list corresponds with many domestic cultural receptors, 
and thus provides indication that an intrinsic attribute of Nucor’s operation is striving 
to and actively embracing social character.   Moreover, the power point presentation 
submits that Nucor’s capabilities “start with its culture and the fundamental 
commitment to employees who create tremendous efficiencies”.  
 As with the Southwest data, it is important to notice the social and human 
focus of these submissions, which in the process of an amalgamation facilitated 
inside Nucor, creates a culture that empowers the firm to achieve extraordinary 
outcomes. This is evidence that their culture is acting as a resource within Nucor, 
and apparently a resource that is quite challenging to imitate as is indicated by the 
declining achievement of the American steel industry (see Table 1), 
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Table 1.  U.S. Economic Census - metal manufacturing industry 
     
1997 
NAICS 
code  
Kind of business or 
industry 
with link to definition 
Year Annual 
payroll 
($1,000) 
   2002 5,952 135,825,163 21,176,504 488,983 331  Primary metal    
manufacturing     
1997 
5,059 168,117,728 23,811,233 605,085 
Estab-
lish-
ments
Sales, receipts, 
revenue,
or shipments
($1,000)
Paid
employees
 
and August 2004 year to date financial comparisons of Nucor and several of its 
industry competitors (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2.   Direct Competitor Comparison*  
 NUE AKS CMC X Industry 
Market Cap: (6.26B) 625.32M 936.99M 3.99B 687.27M 
Employees: 9,900 9,000 7,873 (47,000) 3.15K 
Rev. Growth: 30.50% -5.80% 17.50% (34.20%) 17.50% 
Revenue: (8.31B) 4.52B 4.11B N/A 1.44B 
Gross Margin: 11.15% 7.68% (12.38%) 10.40% 11.15% 
EBITDA: (1.01B) -219.90M 243.19M -164.00M 81.06M 
Oper. Margins: (7.31%) -9.63% 3.70% -5.09% 6.22% 
Net Income: (401.25M) -461.60M 95.41M 211.00M 9.70M 
EPS: (5.06) -4.256 3.209 N/A 0.39 
PE: (15.61) N/A 9.99 N/A 12.33 
PS: (0.74) 0.14 0.22 N/A 0.41  
 
AKS = AK Steel Holding Corp 
CMC = Commercial Metals Co 
X = United States Steel Corp 
Industry = Iron & Steel 
* Competitors chosen based upon the most actively traded stocks in this industry year to date - 
Fidelity Investments, August 1, 2004. 
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 Interestingly, the examination of Nucor’s data raises some of the same issues 
as did the Southwest’s data.  The leading question is the relationship between 
cultural realms and how this dynamic plays out through the course of an 
organization’s commercial endeavors.  The evidence suggests that Nucor 
perceptively exhibits both inner and other-directed cultural characteristics as a 
means to produce distinctive achievement.  Integral to this ability is a set of 
organizational variables that are intrinsic in Nucor’s culture: employee focus, 
egalitarianism, solidarity, safety, leadership tenure, customer service, quality 
standards, ethics and integrity, continued improvement, risk taking, pay for 
performance, environmental concern, decentralized divisions, entrepreneurial sprit, 
and profitability. These variables represent an important list that has future cultural 
and organizational research relevance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Even though Southwest and Nucor are in very different industries, the correlations 
between the firms are quite striking.  Each firm’s culture seems to act as a guidance 
system which establishes and maintains a fit with social character.  Nucor’s and 
Southwest’s history reflects stable leadership - not only in the person holding the 
position, but also in their continued reliance upon principles they established as 
basis to lead. The companies both submit their culture as a catalyst that produces 
unique capabilities and efficiencies.  These organizations develop and implement 
relatively straightforward strategies such as growth through acquisitions or lowering 
operation costs while providing a superior product at competitive prices. But, by 
utilizing their culture during this process produce unique outcomes.  
 The realization that both companies exhibit inner and other-directed cultural 
attributes may serve to further substantiate the strategic-culture paradigm. This 
submission is reasonable if the characteristics of domestic culture are considered.  
Arguably social character is both inner and other-directed.  A cautious submission is 
that the organizations in this study are simply mirroring social character in a 
purposeful manner.  Their unique success with this strategy produces an 
extraordinary cultural fit, and associated capabilities that result in remarkable 
performance. Further study to substantiate this claim is needed.      
 As a last note, I address the ongoing discourse surrounding recent 
questionable corporate activities. The premise that intensifying business regulation 
will produce long-term alignment of commercial interests with populace expectations 
and satisfactions is not supported.   That is, reliance upon government regulation to 
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effectively steer corporate behavior is an approach which has produced ephemeral 
results, and inevitably have been consistently thwarted by various corporations 
whose focus is to garner financial capital and exploit a regularity system that is 
interpreted as contrary to their financial aspirations (Prechel, 2000).  The ostensibly 
widespread ideology that increased government regulation is “the key” to making 
business conform to populace expectations is compelling in that it ignores an ardent 
insight.  Writing nearly seventy years ago, Thorstein Veblen, a noted economist, 
cultural theorist and sociological scholar posited the following argument: 
Nothing can serve as a corrective of the cultural trend given by the machine 
discipline except what can be put in the form of a business proposition. The 
question of neutralizing the undesired effects of the machine discipline 
resolves itself into a question as to the cultural work and consequences of the 
business enterprise, and of the cultural value of business principles in so far 
as they guide such human endeavor as lies outside the range of business 
enterprise proper. It is not a question of what ought to be done, but of what is 
the course laid out by business principles; the discretion rests with the 
business men, not with the moralist, and the business men’s discretion is 
bounded by the exigencies of the  business enterprise.  Even the business 
man cannot allow themselves to play fast and loose with business principles 
in response to a call from humanitarian motives.  The question therefore 
remains on the whole, a question of what the business men may be expected 
to do for cultural growth on the motive of profits (Veblen, 1935: 379). 
 
 Veblen illuminates a business and social reality. In order for business 
organizations to entertain refocusing or changing their methods, there must be some 
type of incentive that appeals to the obligatory profit requisite.  My premise is that 
the strategic-culture paradigm addresses corporate concerns with generating profit, 
but more notably it illustrates a framework that integrates corporate and domestic 
culture expectations leading to commercial and social benefits.  It explores an 
avenue by which organizations and their performance may be explained - and 
packages a strategy in the form of a business incentive that appeals to financial 
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requisites with added social benefit. That is, by establishing and continually adapting 
a firm’s culture with the aim of striving to maintain a fit with the domestic context 
corporations are more inclined to realize opportunities, attract customers, and 
endure unanticipated business environmental pressures. 
 I acknowledge that annual reports represent an advertising opportunity for 
corporations. Additionally, the limited data collected for this project does not provide 
a definitive account of Southwest Airlines or Nucor Steel.  However, the evidence 
does sufficiently demonstrate the merits of the strategic-culture paradigm and 
indicates variables that facilitate developing hypothesis and associated 
organizational clarification.   
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